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A commodity is shared between some individuals: There is an initial alloca-
tion; some selection procedures are used to choose an alternative allocation
and; individuals decide between keeping the initial allocation or shifting to the
alternative allocation. The selection procedures are supposed to involve an el-
ement of randomness in order to re°ect uncertainty about economic, social
and political processes. It is shown that for every allocation, ¸, there exists a
number, ³(¸) 2 [0;1], such that, if the number of individuals tends to in¯nity,
then the probability that a proportion of the population smaller (resp. larger)
than ³(¸) prefers an allocation chosen by the selection procedure converges to
1 (resp. 0). The index ³(¸) yields a complete order in the set of Pareto op-
timal allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures
are provided.
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11 Introduction
The present paper investigates the general question of whether social choice rules, es-
pecially voting rules, can be used to distinguish and even better rank Pareto-optimal
allocations. The present framework is too simple to yield a general answer to this ques-
tion. Nevertheless it provides a partial positive answer. For the sake of clarity, and in
order to ¯x ideas it might be helpful to give a short introduction to the framework as well
as the main results of the present paper before entering into its motivation.
A family of simple models is considered: The set of divisions of one unit of a commodity
between m individuals. A division of the commodity is thus a vector ¸ with m nonnegative
coordinates that sum up to one, i.e. it is a point in the (m-1){simplex and it is called an
allocation throughout the paper. Individuals are assumed to care only about their own
share of the commodity so obviously all allocations are Pareto-optimal.
Fix the number of individuals, m, an allocation, ¸, and an integer, n, n 2 f1;:::;mg.
The main aim of the paper is to compute the \number" of other allocations, ¸0, that
are such that at least n individuals are better o® with ¸0 than with ¸. Since we have
a continuum of allocations, the natural way to count this \number" of allocations is to
compute their volume or Lebesgue measure. Clearly this volume is 1 for n = 1 and 0 for
n = m because all allocations are Pareto optimal. The main result is the following: There
exists a number, ³(¸) 2 [0;1], such that these volumes converge to 1 for n=m < ³(¸) and
to 0 for n=m > ³(¸) as the number of individuals tends to in¯nity. As an example, for the
egalitarian allocation, ¸ = (1=m;:::;1=m), the threshold value converges to e¡1 ¼ 0:37
as the number of individuals tends to in¯nity1. Of course the number, ³(¸), depends
on how volumes of allocations are measured as well as the allocation therefore a family
of measures, all related to the Lebesgue measure, are considered. For every measure in
this family a simple model is obtained and the same threshold phenomenon as for the
Lebesgue measure is observed.
The occurence of this threshold e®ect as the number of individuals tends to in¯nity
constitutes the main result of the paper. It is derived quite \mechanically" from compu-
tations in the sense that it is based on a purely parametric approach, where the Lebesgue
measure in accordance with Laplace's advice is taken as the most neutral and natural
measure. It should be noted that the case of a ¯nite (but large) number of individuals
1Volume of the set of allocations that are better than the egalitarian allocation for a proportion larger
than ½ of the population: For ½ = 0:5, it is 2¢10¡5 for m = 100 and 2¢10¡9 for m = 200 and; for ½ = 0:4,
it is 0:08 for m = 100 and 0:03 for m = 200.
2is of course the most interesting case; actually, going to the limit with a continuum of
individuals, where the threshold is clear-cut, is a mean to extract information for the
¯nite case. Therefore the paper also contains results about the strength of the threshold
e®ect for the ¯nite case.
The motivation for this parametric approach and the computation of those volumes is
clear: Starting from an allocation, ¸, it is obviously very easy to ¯nd another allocation,
¸0, that makes all individuals but one better o®: We just have to take the share of one
individual and split it between the others. Thus, if most social choice rules behave as
Maxwell's devil and select alternative allocations that are exactly in this almost zero-
measure set where all individuals but one are better o® then the parametric approach
followed in the present paper would be gratuitous and the main result would be a mere
curiosity. However there are many upstream economic, social and political reasons why
this is not the case. Indeed, uncertainty about characteristics, outcomes of social as well
as political processes may be major reasons why Maxwell's devil is less relevant.
Even though it is beyond the primary concern of the present paper some attempts to
justify the parametric approach by yielding microeconomic illustrations of why Maxwell's
devil is less relevant and macroeconomic interpretations of the parametric approach's con-
sequences are made. Of course our aim is to argue against Maxwell's devil-like arguments
and, more boldly, to advocate for the interest of interpreting the Lebesgue measure as a
probability distribution over the set of allocations as representing how alternative allo-
cations are selected. The ¯rst two illustrations are very simple non-coorperative games
where m individuals have to share one unit of a commodity. The ¯rst game being a one-
shot game and the second game being bargaining a la Rubinstein. The last illustration
is a pure exchange economy with consumption externalities involving two consumers and
one good.
It is an implicit conjecture in the present paper that numerous upstream mechanisms
to divide a commodity generate (and can be identi¯ed with) probability distributions over
the (m-1){simplex of allocations2 as soon as they involve an element of randomness which
is a fair assumption in case of uncertainty about characteristics, outcomes of social as well
as political processes. We conjecture that the nature of the result (the threshold e®ect)
will appear very often in large populations. The paper focuses on a family of special
distributions but ongoing research seeks to qualify \often".
2The induced distribution might be degenerate: A way to share a commodity could be to pull out knifes
and give it to the surviving guy; the distribution is concentrated on the vertices of the (m-1){simplex,
1=m chance for everybody provided that there are no strong (wo)men.
3Indeed, natural and easy interpretations of these distributions are given in terms
of wealth distributions by use of a simple urn model that dates back to Polya and
Eggenberger3. So the interest of the Lebesgue measure goes beyond the brutal para-
metric approach with the belief that Maxwell's devil does not strike too often.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework. Section 3
illustrates the choice of the Lebesgue measure as a selection mechanism. In Section 4 the
main results are stated; it mainly contains the de¯nition of the index ³ and the study of
its asymptotic properties. The family of selection mechanisms at scope in the paper are
given an interpretation in Section 5. Finally section 6 o®ers interpretations of the results
together with some concluding comments. All proofs are gathered in the appendix, which
starts with a section on urn models, with emphasize on the notion of occupancy. Indeed,
urn models turn out to be very helpful for the computation of the various probabilities,
on which the proposed ranking of allocations is based.
2 The framework
Some commodity is allocated between m individuals and the preferences of each individual












where the i'th coordinate is the share of the i'th individual. Clearly, indi®erence sets for
the i'th individual are linear manifolds indexed by the i'th coordinate.4
Generally, as argued in the introduction, uncertainty about characteristics, outcomes
of social as well as economic processes introduces an element of randomness in the selection
of allocations - some illustrations are provided in the next section. Therefore selection
procedures are identi¯ed with probability measures over the set of allocations, Sm¡1. In
the present paper, the Lebesgue measure { called indi®erently the uniform distribution {
is studied so that computing probabilities merely reduces to computing volumes. But in
order to study di®erent selection procedures, the uniform distribution is considered over
3The literature on preference formation in a voting population facing a set of candidates has made
extensive use of these Polya-Eggenberger urn models, see Berg (1985) and Berg & Gehrlein (1992).
4In Karni & Safra (1995) a similar framework is considered, but the commodity is supposed to be
indivisible and points in the (m-1){simplex are probability distributions, where the i'th coordinate is the
probability that the i'th individual gets the commodity. However Karni & Safra is concerned with the
existence of social welfare functions, while the present paper is concerned with allocative stability.
4the set of all possible divisions of the commodity into cm pieces (with c 2 N), so that all
individuals get c pieces. For di®erent values of c, the uniform distribution over the set of
divisions of the commodity into cm pieces induces di®erent probability distributions over
the set of allocations. Indeed, divisions induce allocations as described hereafter.














where the j'th coordinate is the size of the j'th piece, and the (cm-1){simplex is endowed
with the Lebesgue measure. Given a division of the commodity, the share of an individual





Clearly, indi®erence sets for the i'th individual in the (cm-1){simplex are linear manifolds
which are indexed by the sum of the individual's pieces. A probability measure over the
set of allocations is induced by the Lebesgue measure over the set of divisions and the












The density of the induced probability measure on Sm¡1 can easily be computed.










Remark Consider the egalitarian allocation, ¸ = (1=m;:::;1=m) and another allocation






Therefore, the induced probability measure on Sm¡1 converges to the Dirac measure with
support on the egalitarian allocation as c tends to in¯nity { the notion of convergence left
unde¯ned. This can be caught intuitively by remembering that c is the number of pieces
that every individual gets and that the more pieces individuals get the more are shares
averaged.
53 Illustration of the Lebesgue measure
3.1 Example of a simple game
A population of m individuals want to share one unit of a commodity: A cake, represented
by the uniform unit disk. The individuals might simply decide to share the cake evenly.
There are a lot of more or less complicated mechanisms proposed in the literature. This
section introduces one that is quite simple and moreover can result in any member of the
family of distributions with densities (pc)c2N.
The basic game: The m individuals choose simultaneously a point on the unit circle;
µ 2 [0;2¼]. Thus m points are chosen: (µi)m
i=1. There exists a permutation of the agents,
¾, such that
0 · µ¾(1) · µ¾(2) · ::: · µ¾(m) · 2 ¼:
The share of agent i is the slice of the cake contained between the radii de¯ned by his
chosen point µi and the ¯rst one encountered counterclock-wise: suppose i = ¾(k), it is
the portion (µ¾(k);µ¾(k+1)), with the convention that ¾(m+1) = ¾(1). For this game it is
a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies that all individuals choose their points on the unit
circle according to the uniform distribution. It is shown that the induced distribution
over the (m-1){simplex of shares is the uniform distribution.
Proposition 1 If all individuals choose their points on the unit circle according to the
uniform distribution over the interval [0;2¼], then the game induces the uniform distribu-
tion over the (m-1){simplex of allocations.
Proof Follows from Tovey (1997). Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 Suppose that ¯rst individuals divide the commodity into c small pieces of
equal size (each of them represented as a uniform unit disk) second they share every piece
by playing the described game. Then for the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where
all individuals choose their points on the unit circle according to the uniform distribution
the induced distribution over the (m-1){simplex of shares has density pc.
3.2 Example of a less simple game
As in the previous game a population of m individuals want to share one unit of a
commodity. There is an initial allocation and individuals can decide by voting whether
they keep their initial shares or they enter into bargaining a la Rubinstein in order to
6select another allocation. However as explained in Osborne & Rubinstein (1990) and van
Damme (1991) all allocations can be supported as subgame perfect equilibria provided
that there are more than two individuals, m ¸ 3. Thus the outcome of bargaining is
characterized by indeterminacy, so unless individuals coordinate their strategies it is far
from obvious how individuals should play.
Individuals can coordinate their strategies through some extrinsic random variable
such that all individuals observe this variable and coordinate their strategies on it. Indeed
suppose that all individuals believe that the choices of strategies of all other individuals
depend on a random variable on the (m-1){simplex such that if the random variable
takes the value ¸ then they play strategies that make the allocation ¸ a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Then all individuals play strategies that make the allocation ¸ a subgame
perfect allocation. All distributions of the random variable seem to be equally reasonable,
in particular the family of distributions with densities (pc)c2N is just as reasonable as all
other distributions. Perhaps the uniform distribution is a natural prior, because if all
allocations are equally reasonable then the uniform distribution over the set of allocations
seems to be a neutral belief.
In order to complete the description of the game suppose that the random variable
is drawn from a distribution with density pc for c 2 N and that ¯rst the value of the
random variable is revealed and second individuals vote about keeping their initial shares
or entering into bargaining. For this game the main result of the present paper is that for
any initial allocation, ¸, there exists a number, ³c(¸) 2 [0;1], such that the probability
that there is a n=m proportion that prefers an allocation selected according to the extrinsic
random variable converges to 1 for n=m < ³c(¸) and to 0 for n=m > ³c(¸) as m tends to
in¯nity.
It should be remarked that the coordination of individuals' strategies by some extrinsic
random variable implies that sunspots matter, see Cass & Shell (1983) and Shell (1987).
However in games with indeterminacy it seems quite natural that players coordinate their
strategies { at least to some degree { and they can only coordinate on an extrinsic random
variable.
3.3 Example of a market mechanism
A general model of consumption externalities was introduced in Arrow (1969) and ex-
tensively studied in Crµ es (1996). Consider an economy with 1 commodity and 2 con-
sumers where agents in°ict negative consumption externalities to each other. Let x1
7(resp. x2) denote the consumption of consumer 1 (resp. consumer 2). Consumer 1's, re-
spectively consumer 2's, utility function is given by U1(x1;x2) = logx1 ¡ x2, respectively
U2(x1;x2) = logx2 ¡ x1. Externalities are individualized as in Arrow (1969) through
markets: There are, beside the usual market for the proper commodity, also markets
for externalities. Consumers face individualized prices on all markets, behave as price-
takers and express demands for both their proper and external consumptions. Prices clear
markets.
Both consumers are endowed with 1 unit of the commodity. Moreover, beside these
endowments in physical consumption good, legal entitlements are distributed to the con-
sumers that represent, in a Coasian world, the initial juridical situation from where they
can trade on external e®ects; this legal entitlement, denoted ! is the same for both
consumers, to respect the symmetry between them. In this example, we consider the
parametric family of economies where ! is taken, to ¯x idea, in [¡1;1]. No value of
! sounds more \reasonable" or probable than another. So that assuming the Lebesgue
measure on this parametric family seems a fair assumption.
The system of equilibrium equations of this market economy is equivalent to the system
of equilibrium equations derived from the usual planner's program, with the addition of
consumer 1's budget constraint. Consumer 1's consumption x1 can be expressed as a





3 ¡ 4t ¡
p
32t2 ¡ 32t + 9
´
and of course x2(t) = x1(1 ¡ t) = 2 ¡ x1(t). Both x1(t) and U1(x1(t);x2(t)) are increas-
ing function of t. For any value of the legal entitlement !, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium where the consumers are treated equally by the market; it is described by:
x1 = x2 = 1, t = 1=2. But if ! 2 [¡1;¡0:5] (this corresponds to the case where the legal
authority wants to compensate for the negative externality through the legal entitlement),
there exists also a pair of asymmetric equilibria. Thus we know that for ! 2 [¡1;¡0:5],
there exists a corresponding value t(!) 6= 1=2 and x1 6= x2; the equilibrium allocations
are (x1(t(!));x2(t(!))) and (x1(1 ¡ t(!));x2(1 ¡ t(!))). It is easy to compute, for an










Plotting this function yields the following curve: The curve being almosty linear, the uni-
form distribution over the set of parameters ! 2 [¡1;1] generates a distribution over the
8t
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1{simplex of welfare weights a distribution which is close to be uniform. Either there are
no asymmetric equilibria (! 2 [¡0:5;1]) or there are, and then they are evenly distributed
in the 1{simplex of welfare weights. Suppose this example can be, to some extent, gen-
eralized: there are m consumers in°icting external e®ects on each other. Economies are
parametrized by endowments and/or legal entitlements. Suppose that welfare weights
yield reasonable ordinal comparisons of the utility level of the consumers5. Suppose the
Lebesgue measure induces, on the (m-1){simplex of welfare weights, a distribution whose
density is close to pc; since for any c, the value of ³c at the center of the simplex is
smaller than 0.5, it can be asserted that for most economies the symmetric equilibrium
defeats asymmetric equilibria by pairwise comparison through majority voting: it is then
a Condorcet winner.
This example is not introduced to lead to such an hypothetic statement. Its main
virtue is to provide an example of a microeconomic model that generates a distribution
over the simplex which is close to the uniform distribution. The starting point consists
in considering a parametric model in which assuming the Lebesgue measure is the most
neutral and natural assumption.
5This is true in the example: U1(x1(t);x2(t)) is an increasing function of t. But it is di±cult to admit it
is still the case when there are more than 2 consumers: utility levels depend on all welfare weights; at most
it can be conjectured that for nice enough classes of utility functions, even though \indi®erence surfaces"
in the (m-1){simplex of welfare weights are not hyperplanes, they can be straightened by application of
a di®eomorphism.
94 Main results
For ¸;¸0 2 Sm¡1 let N(¸;¸0) ½ M = f1;:::;mg be the set of indices for which ¸i < ¸0
i.
Let Tn(¸) ½ Sm¡1 be the set of points ¸0 for which N(¸;¸0) contains exactly n elements
and; Un(¸) ½ Sm¡1 be the set of points for which N(¸;¸0) contains at least n elements.
Hence Tn(¸) is the set of allocations which are prefered by exactly n individuals to the
allocation ¸, and Un(¸) is the set of allocations which are prefered by at least n individuals
to the allocation ¸.




















































M n J = fi1;:::;im¡jg
and Mj is the set of all subsets of M with j elements.
Remark As shown and developped in the appendix, the quantities tc;n(¸) and uc;n(¸)
are known in discrete probability theory. Consider m urns and (cm ¡ 1) balls which are
allocated into the m urns according to the probability distribution ¸ over the urns (i.e.
every ball is allocated to urn i with probability ¸i). Then tc;n(¸) is the probability that
exactly n urns contain less than c balls and uc;n(¸) is the probability that at least n urns
contain less than c balls.
Clearly
1 = uc;1(¸) ¸ ::: ¸ uc;n(¸) ¸ uc;n+1(¸) ¸ ::: ¸ uc;m(¸) = 0;
10because Pareto optimal allocations are only considered. The quantity uc;n(¸) is the prob-
ability that an allocation chosen by the selection procedure is prefered to the initial allo-
cation ¸ by at least n individuals. On the one hand if uc;n(¸) is small for some small ratio
n=m, then ¸ is stable in the sense that it is quite unlikely that an alternative allocation
that is chosen by the selection procedure is preferred by a r-majority for r ¸ n=m. On the
other hand if uc;n(¸) is large for some large ratio n=m, then ¸ is unstable in the sense that
it is quite likely that an alternative allocation that is chosen by the selection procedure is
preferred by a r-majority for r · n=m. Of course it is pretty subjective whether a ratio
is small or large, but in order to ¯x ideas it is helpful to think of small ratios as being
signi¯cantly smaller than 1=2 and large ratios as being signi¯cantly larger than 1=2.
De¯nition 1 Let ¸;¸0 2 Sm¡1 then ¸ is at least as stable as ¸0 if and only if
uc;n(¸) · uc;n(¸
0)
for all n 2 M.
Hence in order to compare the stability of the two allocations ¸ and ¸0, the two
\curves", (n=m;uc;n(¸))m
n=1 and (n=m;uc;n(¸0))m
n=1, have to be compared, but these two































u1;2(¸) ¼ 0:730 and u1;3(¸) ¼ 0:098
u1;2(¸0) ¼ 0:716 and u1;3(¸0) ¼ 0:104
u1;2(¸00) = 1 and u1;3(¸00) = 1:
Thus ¸ and ¸0 are both at least as stable as ¸00 but they cannot be ranked. On the one
hand, if the curves do not cross then the allocation with the curve to the left is at least
as stable as the other one { see ¯gure 1.a. On the other hand, if the curves do cross then
the allocations cannot be ranked { see ¯gure 1.b.
4.1 The index
In order to study asymptotic properties of the ranking of allocations relative to their
stability, the relation between allocations for m individuals and allocations for m + 1














Hence let ¸ be a probability measure on the Borel sets of the unit interval then ¸















for all other i 2 M
Let ® be the Lebesgue measure then a probability measure, ¯, is absolutely continuous if
and only if ¯(A) = 0 , ®(A) = 0 and it is singular if there exists B such that ¯(B) = 1
and ®(B) = 0. According to the Lebesgue decomposition theorem (see It^ o (1984)) there
exists a unique decomposition of ¸ into a convex combination of an absolutely continuous
probability measure, °, and a singular probability measure, ±, such that
¸ = w° + (1 ¡ w)±
where w 2 [0;1].
With the present relation between allocations and individuals the study of the asymp-
totic properties of the ranking of allocations relative to their stability reduces to the study
of asymptotic properties of sequences of curves, ((n=m;uc;m;n(¸m))m
n=1)m2N.
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For ¸ the associated sequence of curves, ((n=m;uc;m;n(¸m)m
n=1)m2N, converges point-
wise to the following correspondence
dc(¸;r) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
1 for r < ³c(¸)
[0;1] for r = ³c(¸)
0 for r > ³c(¸):
according to theorem 1. Since curves are decreasing the largest deviations between curves,
((n=m;uc;m;n(¸m)m
n=1)m2N, and correspondences, dc, are for the smallest deviations be-
tween n=m and ³c(¸).
Observation 1 For all m 2 N and all c 2 N
uc;m;n(¸m) ¸
(n=m ¡ ³c;m(¸m))2
(n=m ¡ ³c;m(¸m))2 + bc;m
for n=m · ³c;m(¸m)
uc;m;n(¸m) ·
bc;m
(n=m ¡ ³c;m(¸m))2 + bc;m





























limm!1 ³c;m(¸m) = ³c(¸)
limm!1 bc;m = 0:
Moreover the proof of observation 1 reveals that bc;m comes from a very conservative
approximation, perhaps bc;m can be replace by a constant, which does not depend on c.
By an application of observation 1 it is possible to discuss how complete the ranking
by stability is, i.e. for which relative sizes of groups is it possible to rank two allocations









































Hence the ranking of allocations by their stability becomes \more and more" complete as
the number of individuals tends to in¯nity. Indeed if ³c(¸) < ³c(¸0) then the associated
curves can only cross for n=m closer and closer to ³c;m(¸m), where the curve for ¸0
m
converges to one, or ³c;m(¸0
m), where the curve for ¸m converges to zero, as m tends to
in¯nity because bc;m converges to zero and ³c;m converges to ³c as m tends to in¯nity.
De¯nition 2 For m 2 N and all c 2 N the index of an allocation, ¸m 2 Sm¡1, is
³c;m(¸m).
The index of an allocation is the expected relative size of the group of individuals who
prefer an allocation chosen by the selection procedure to the allocation in question as
shown in the appendix. To pursue the translation in terms of occupancy, as it is shown in
the appendix, the index is the expected ratio of urns that are allocated less than c balls
when allocating (cm ¡ 1) balls into m urns according to the probability distribution ¸.















Hence, the index is a weighted sum of the probabilities that either exactly or at least
n individuals prefer an allocation chosen by the selection procedure to the allocation in
question. Observation 1 shows that the index contains relevant information with respect
to ranking by stability, while observation 2 shows that the index has a reasonable inter-
pretation. For an allocation, ¸, in Sm¡1 consider m¡2 hypersurfaces of Sm¡1 through ¸
de¯ned by uc;n(¸0) = uc;n(¸) for n 2 f2;:::;mg. If these m¡2 level surfaces coincide then
ranking by stability is complete, but as shown after de¯nition 1 it is not. Observation 2 is
14a ¯rst step toward showing that the iso-index hypersurface (de¯ned by ³c;m(¸) = ³c;m(¸0))
are \in between" the m¡2 level surfaces. As an illustration reconsider the example after
de¯nition 1, then ¯gure 2.a and ¯gure 2.b illustrate this construction. The level curves
on ¯gure 2.a, §2 and §3, are the sections of the two hypersurfaces de¯ned respectively
by u1;2(¸¤) = u1;2(¸) and u1;3(¸¤) = u1;3(¸) by the hyperplane ¸4 = 1=5 (the triangle {
here a 2-simplex of size 4/5 { is of course the section of the 3-simplex S3 by the same
hyperplane). On ¯gure 2.a, the six small stripes of space in between §2 and §3 are the
allocations that cannot be compared with ¸ using the ranking by stability.
Figure 2.a Figure 2.b
§2
§3
It is easy to check that ¸0 is in one of these stripes. On ¯gure 2.b the iso-index curve
is added and it is between §2 and §3, and to some extent sums up the information that
they both give in terms of ranking by stability.















Consider the egalitarian allocation, where all individuals share the commodity, then
³1(¸) = e
¡1 ¼ 0:37:
Therefore the expected number of individuals who prefer an allocation chosen by the
selection procedure is approximately 0:37m for m large. For the egalitarian allocation:
u1;40 = 0:08 and u1;50 = 2 ¢ 10
¡5
15for m = 100 and
u1;80 = 0:03 and u1;100 = 2 ¢ 10
¡9
for m = 200.
Consider an allocation, where two thirds of the individuals share the commodity and


















Therefore the expected number of individuals who prefer an allocation chosen by the
selection procedure is approximately 0:48m for m large. Hence the egalitarian allocation
is more stable than the other allocation, where two thirds of the individuals share the
commodity and one third of the individuals get nothing.

























For the egalitarian allocation, ³3(¸) ¼ 0:423 and for an allocation, where ten eleventh
of the individuals share the commodity and one eleventh of the individuals get nothing,
³3(¸) ¼ 0:418. Hence the allocation, where ten eleventh of the individuals share the
commodity and one eleventh of the individuals get nothing, is more stable than the
egalitarian allocation for m large - even though it is not much. Recall that c is the
number of pieces that individuals get and the more pieces that individuals get the more
are shares averaged, therefore individuals, who have more than 1=m of the commodity,
tend to prefer the allocation in question rather than an allocation chosen by the selection
procedure.
Suppose that ¸ = w° + (1 ¡ w)± where ° is an absolutely continuous probability
measure and ± is a singular probability measure then Dw³c(¸) < 0 according to some












Then fc(x) is the marginal contribution to the index of an individual who gets x and
gc(x) is the index of an allocation where some group of size 1¡1=x gets nothing and some
16group of size 1=x shares the commodity. fc(x) is strictly decreasing on [0;1[, strictly
concave on [0;(c ¡ 1)=c] and strictly convex on [(c ¡ 1]=c;1[ according to some straight
forward calculations. Therefore, in order to minimize ³c(¸), individuals should get either
0 or (c¡1)=c provided that they get something in [0;(c¡1)=c] and individuals should all
get the same provided that they get something in [(c¡1)=c;1[. So, if ¸ minimizes ³c(¸)
then there exists x 2 [(c ¡ 1)=c;1[ { actually x ¸ 1 { such that some group of size 1=x
shares the commodity and the rest gets nothing. Therefore, the solution to
min gc(x)
s.t. x ¸ 1
characterizes the allocations that minimize ³c(¸) in the sense that if x solves the problem
then some group of size 1=x should share the commodity and some group of size 1 ¡1=x
should get nothing. In order to study whether the egalitarian allocation minimizes ³c(¸),
































according to some straight forward calculations. We conjecture that Dxgc(1) < 0 for all
c ¸ 3 which implies that the egalitarian allocations does not minimize ³c(¸) for c ¸ 3 but
we have not been able to prove this conjecture.
4.2 Interpretation of the Lebesgue measure
The selection procedures studied in the present paper are taken to be the uniform dis-
tribution over the set of divisions, i.e. the (cm-1){simplex, or equivalently the induced
family of probability distributions on the set of allocations, i.e. the (m-1){simplex. These
probability distributions can be generated by the P¶ olya-Eggenberger urn models that give
an alternative interpretation of the selection procedures. Indeed in this alternative inter-
pretation \equalitarianism", i.e. the extent to which it is easier for a wealthy individual
than for a poor individual to become wealthier, becomes important.
The structure of P¶ olya-Eggenberger urn models6 is the following: An urn contains cm
balls of m di®erent colours, c balls of each colour; balls are drawn at random and after
6In Berg (1985) and Gehrlein and Berg (1992) P¶ olya-Eggenberger distributions are used to model
17each draw it is put back into the urn with s more balls of the same color; k draws are
made. Hence P¶ olya-Eggenberger urn models are parametrized by c and s.










(c + s(ki ¡ 1)):::c
(cm + s(k ¡ 1)):::cm
(2)
For s = c = 1 the uniform probability measure on distributions of balls is generated
Pr[k1;:::;km] =
k!
(m + k ¡ 1):::m
=
0





Let ¸i = ki=k then (¸i)m
i=1 is a point in the (m-1){simplex (ki)m
i=1. Clearly the probability
measures on allocations of balls induces a probability measure on the (m-1){simplex, but
only 0




points are in the support of the probability measure. Indeed the selection procedures con-
sidered in the present paper can be obtained as limits of P¶ olay-Eggenberger urn models.
Proposition 3 If s = 1 and k tends to in¯nity then the induced probability measure on









in the weak topology.
Proof For s = 1, equation (2) is
P[k1;:::;km] =
0














i=1ki = k. Let ¸ = (¸i)m
























because the Lebesgue measure of Sm¡1 is 1=(m¡1)! if it is projected on m¡1 coordinates.
Q.E.D.
Remark According to lemma 1 the induced probability measure on the Sm¡1 simplex
is identical to the probability measure on allocations induced by the uniform probability
distribution on divisions into cm pieces.
P¶ olya-Eggenberger urn models lead to an alternative interpretation of probability dis-
tributions on allocations: The commodity is divided into k pieces of equal size and; every
time a ball of color i is drawn individual i receives a piece of the commodity. Recall that
if a ball of color i is drawn then it is put back into the urn with s more balls of the same
color. Therefore if s=c is small then the initial distribution of balls is important compared
with the number of balls that are put into the urn after the draws and if s=c is large then
the number of balls that are put into the urn after the draws are important compared
with the the initial distribution of balls. Hence s=c seems to be a natural measure of the
degree of equalitarianism, i.e. the extent to which it is easier for a wealthy individual
than for a poor individual to become wealthier.
On the one hand, if s = 0 then the probability, that a ball of color i is drawn, does







that converges to the Dirac measure concentrated on the egalitarian allocation as k tends
to in¯nity. On the other hand, if s is very large then the ¯rst draw almost completely de-
termines the allocation. In this case the probability distribution obtained is concentrated
on the m vertices of the Sm¡1 simplex hence it corresponds to a kind of \winner takes
it all" selection procedure. Neither case seems to be relevant from an empirical point
of view because they result in trivial distributions where one individual gets everything
while the others get nothing. This is the main reason to exclude these cases from the
present paper.
195 Concluding Comments
In the present paper the stability of allocations has been studied from a combinatorial
point of view in a quite simple model where power of groups is related to their size as
in voting. Allocations were ranked according to their stability unfortunately this ranking
turned out not to be complete. However as the number of individual tends to in¯nity the
ranking becomes more and more complete. Indeed it was shown that every allocation can
be associated with an index such that the ranking of allocations by this index converge
to the ranking of allocations by stability in the sense that these two rankings deviate
only for groups of smaller and smaller or larger and larger relative size as the number of
individuals tends to in¯nity.
All allocations are unstable provided that groups of small relative size are allowed to
in°uence as in infra-majority voting, i.e. there is always somebody who wants another
allocation. Similarly all allocations are stable provided that groups of large relative size
are allowed to in°uence as in supra-majority voting, i.e. there is never unanimity to want
another allocation. Therefore if respect for minorities is interpreted as allowing groups of
small relative size to in°uence then there is a trade-o® between stability and respect for
minorities. The index for an allocation is more or less the in¯mum of the relative sizes
of groups that can be allowed to in°uence while keeping the allocation stable. Indeed if
the index for an allocation is close to zero then the allocation is stable even if groups of
very small relative size are allowed to in°uence and if the index is close to one then the
allocation is stable only if groups of very large relative size are allowed to in°uence. Hence
the index of an allocation is a measure of the degree of the trade-o® between stability and
respect for minorities.
Clearly the assumptions, i.e. the uniform distribution on the set of divisions, are very
important for the results of the present paper. The robustness of the results with regard
to other distributions, especially that the ranking of allocations by stability becomes more
and more complete as the number of individuals tends to in¯nity, remains to be explored.
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227 Appendix
As noted in the remark to proposition 2 and section 4, urn models are very useful in relation to the
present paper. First urn models are introduced and studied with emphasize on the notion of occupancy
and asymptotic properties. Second results in the present paper are established.
7.1 Urn Models and Occupancy
This subsection of the appendix is mainly expository (see Kolchin, Sevast'yanov & Chistyakov (1978)
and Johnson & Kotz (1978) for more details) and all results that are not established are stated and
established in either Kolchin, Sevast'yanov & Chistyakov (1978) or Johnson & Kotz (1978). Let m ¸ 2
be a natural number and let M = f1;:::;mg. Moreover let Mj be the set of all subsets of M with j 2 M






For m distiguishable urns let ¹ = (pi)i2M be a probability measure on the set of urns, i.e. pi 2 R+
for all i 2 M and X
i2M
pi = 1;
and consider random distributions of r indistinguishable balls into the urns. The balls are supposed to
be distributed independently according to ¹, i.e. pi is the probability that a ball is assigned to the i'th
urn.
7.1.1 Empty Urns
For distributions of balls into urns, some urns are empty and some urns are occupied. Let X0 be the
number of empty urns, then the probability that n urns are empty is





















as shown by an application of the inclusion-exclusion principle7, and the probability that at least n urns
are empty is










7See the proof of proposition 2














((1 ¡ pi ¡ pj)r ¡ (1 ¡ pi)r(1 ¡ pj)r)
Clearly the expected value attains its minimum in the symmetric case where pi = 1=m for all i 2 M, this
case is called the classical occupancy distribution Pn(r;m) and


















n! j! (m ¡ n ¡ j)!



























Let Xa be the number of urns that contain exactly a balls after the distribution of r balls. In particular,




















































j(1 ¡ pi)n¡a(1 ¡ pj)n¡a:
Let Yc be the sum of c random variables, X0, ..., Xc¡1, Yc = X0 + ::: + Xc¡1.












where c · r.
Lemma 3 The probabilitiy that there are exactly n urns that contain less than c balls each is










and the probabilitiy that there are at least n urns with less than c balls is




































M n J = fi1;:::;im¡jg
Proof Only the probability that all urns in a speci¯ed subset of m¡j urns contain less than c balls has
to be computed because the probability that exactly m ¡ j urns contain less than c balls each follows
from an application of the inclusion-exclusion principle.
Consider m ¡ j urns then the probability that they contain less than c balls each is computed as
the sum over (khi)
m¡j
i=1 2 f0;:::;c ¡ 1gm¡j of the probabilities that there are khi balls in the hi'th urn
for all i 2 f1;:::;m ¡ jg. For (khi)
m¡j
i=1 the probability that there are khi balls in the hi'th urn for all




























k1!:::km¡j! (r ¡ (k1 + :::km¡j))!
where the multinomial coe±cient is the number of possible distributions such that the hi'th urn contain
khi urns for all i 2 f1;:::;m ¡ jg. Q.E.D.
25Lemma 4 Suppose that r · cm ¡ 1 then
m¡1 X
n=2
Pr[Yc ¸ n] = ¡1 + Qr
c;m¡1(¹):





c;j(¹) = 0; (5)
provided that Qr
c;m(¹) = 1. Hence if less than cm balls are distributed, then the probability that no urn
contain less than c balls is zero.
On the other hand
m¡1 X
n=2








































= ¡1 + Qr
c;m¡1(¹)









according to Johnson & Kotz (1978). Q.E.D.
7.1.3 Asymptotic Properties
Let Za(m) be the normalized random variables of Xa(m), i.e. Za(m) = Xa(m)=m and let Vc(m) be the
sum of c normalized random variables, i.e. Vc(m) = Yc(m)=m =
Pc¡1
a=0 Za(m) then E[Za] = m¡1E[Xa]
and V ar[Za] = m¡2V ar[Xa]. In order to study the asymptotic properties of the Za(m)'s and the
Vc(m)'s as m converge to in¯nity the relation between the number of urns, the number of balls and the
distributions of balls has to be considered. Hence, let ¹ be a probability measure on the Borel sets of the















for all other i 2 M and all M 2 N. Let ® be the Lebesgue measure then a probability measure, ¯, is
absolutely continuous if and only if ¯(A) = 0 , ®(A) = 0 and it is singular if there exists B such that
26¯(B) = 1 and ®(B) = 0. According to the Lebesgue decomposition theorem (see It^ o (1984)) there exists
a unique decomposition of ¹ into a convex combination of an absolutely continuous probability measure,
°, and a singular probability measure, ±, i.e.
¹ = w° + (1 ¡ w)±
where w 2 [0;1].




















Proof The mean values and the variances are treated in two separate parts.




m!1 m¹(Ii(m)(m)) = w°(t) 2 R+










































limm!1(1 ¡ pi(m)(m))r(m)¡a = e¡sw°(t):
























































j(1 ¡ pi)r(m)¡a(1 ¡ pj)r(m)¡a:
The ¯rst term is less than E[Xa(m)], the sum of the second term and the third term is negative, because
(1 ¡ pi ¡ pj) · (1 ¡ pi ¡ pj + pipj) = (1 ¡ pi)(1 ¡ pj);





























Hence V ar[Za(m)] = O(m) for s 2 R++.










1 ¡ (1 ¡ pi)a(1 ¡ pj)a · a(pi + pj)
secondly note that if pi and pj solve
max pa
ipa
j(pi + pj)(1 ¡ pi)r(m)¡2a(1 ¡ pj)r(m)¡2a




· pi = pj =
2a + 1




for r(m) ¸ 2a and thirdly use these bounds on the pi's to ¯nd an upper bound the sum of the fourth and
the ¯fth term. Q.E.D.










































































Za(m)] = O(m) for s 2 R++. Q.E.D.
If s > 0 then the corollary implies that for a ¯xed probability distribution on the unit interval the
distribution of Vc(m) converges to a degenerate distribution because the variance converges to zero. Hence
(Pr[Vc · z])z2[0;1] converges to the following \function"
dc(¹;z) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
0 for z < E[Vc]
[0;1] for z = E[Vc]
1 for z > E[Vc]
Hence for ¯xed c 2 N di®erent probability measures on the unit interval can be ranked by stochastic
dominance by comparing the mean values of the induced, normalized random variables. However for
m 2 N the induced probability measures on the unit interval cannot be ranked only by comparing
the mean values of the induced, normalized random variables because their distribution need not be
degenerate.
7.1.4 Comparisions of Distributions
Consider two probability measures on the unit interval, ¹ and º, by use of the construction in the previous
subsection these probability measures induces two distributions for every m 2 N. Clearly if m 2 N is
large compared to c 2 N then the distributions can be ranked by stochastic dominance { almost.
29Lemma 6 Suppose that a random variable, T 2 R, has mean value E 2 R and variance V 2 R++ then
the distribution, Pr : R ! [0;1], satis¯es the following inequalities
Pr[T · t] ·
V
V + (E ¡ t)2 for t · E
Pr[T · t] ¸
(E ¡ t)2
V + (E ¡ t)2 for t ¸ E:
Proof Suppose that u · 0 and Pr[T ¡ E · u]u + (1 ¡ Pr[T ¡ E · u])v = 0 then V ¸ Pr[T ¡ E ·
u]u2 + (1 ¡ Pr[T ¡ E · u])v2 therefore
Pr[T ¡ E · u] ·
V
V + u2:
Suppose that u ¸ 0 and (1 ¡ Pr[T ¡ E · u])u + Pr[T ¡ E · u]v = 0 then V ¸ Pr[T ¡ E ·
u]u2 + (1 ¡ Pr[T ¡ E · u])v2 therefore




Corollary 3 Suppose that two random variables, S;T 2 R, have mean values ES;ET 2 R with ES · ET
and variances VS;VT 2 R++. If
(ES ¡ t)2(ET ¡ t)2 ¸ VSVT
then
Pr[T · t] ¸ Pr[S · t]
for t 2]ES;ET[.
Proof Follows from
Pr[S · u] ¸
(u ¡ ES)2
VS + (u ¡ ES)2 ¸
VT
VT + (u ¡ ET)2 ¸ Pr[T · u]
by simple manipulations. Q.E.D.
Remark Consider two probability measures on the unit interval, ¹ and º, and c 2 N and suppose that
E[Z¹;c(m)] · E[Zº;c(m)]. If







Pr[Z¹;c(m) · t] ¸ Pr[Zº;c(m) · t]
for t 2 [E[Z¹;c(m)];E[Zº;c(m)]]. Hence for two probability measures on the unit interval if the mean values
of the two induced normalized random variables and m as well as r(m) are large then the distributions
can be ranked by stochastic dominance { almost.
307.2 Proofs
Proof of proposition 2 The proof uses two intermediate results
Lemma 7 For N ½ M let SN(¸) ½ Sm¡1 be the set of allocations, ¸0, such that N ½ N(¸;¸0). Then





















M n N = fi1;:::;im¡jg






i ¡ ¸i for i 2 N
¸0
i for i 2 M n N
for ¸0 such that N ½ N(¸;¸0). Then Ái ¸ 0 for all i and
m X
i=1











Clearly for c = 1 (the uniform distribution) the measure of a (m-1){simplex of size ½ relative to Sm¡1
is ½m¡1.
For c ¸ 2 the integral of the density over the relevant simplex has to be computed. Let N = f1;:::;ng







over allocations in the (m ¡ 2){simplex of size ®, i.e.
Pm
i=2 ¸0
i = ®, that make the individuals f2;:::;ng





























































































over allocations in the (m ¡ 2){simplex of size ®, i.e.
Pm
i=2 ¸0
i = ®, that make the individuals f2;:::;ng






























over the (m ¡ n ¡ 1){simplex de¯ned by
Pi=m
i=n+1 ¸0
i = ® ¡ ¸n is
(® ¡ ¸n)c(m¡n¡1)¡1
(c(m ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ 1)!
:






(c(m ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ 1)!
over the set ¸0





















n + k ¡ 1
n ¡ 1
!
























































gives the result for r = 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 can be established by use of lemma 7 and lemma 8. First the formula for uc;n(¸) has to be
established. The proof follows from the principle of inclusion and exclusion as in the original problem of
occupancy8 and it depends on induction on the index j.
The set Tn(¸) is the union of all sets SN(¸) for all N 2 Mn, i.e. Tn(¸) = [N2MnSN(¸). If the




but these sets intersect, so some parts of are counted more than once. As an example, let N0 be a set of




























8Any standard proof of this result would hold here by noticing that, for any ¯xed subset N 2 M, the
probability that all urn in N contains less than c balls is equal to the probability that all families in N
end up being better o® when choosing an alternative allocation according to the density pc, given the
identi¯cation pi = ¸i. However since the principle of inclusion-exclusion is crucial in the present paper,
it seems adequate to give the argument.




n + i ¡ 2
i ¡ 1
!





















n + i ¡ 1
!Ã
n + i ¡ 2
i ¡ 1
!
times that is equal to
1 ¡ (¡1)i
Ã
n + i ¡ 1
i
!
times according to lemma (8). Hence a volume corresponding to a set of (n+i) integers has to be counted
(¡1)i
Ã
n + i ¡ 1
i
!
















hence if j = m¡n¡i the expression of proposition 2 is obtained. The volume of tc;n(¸) follows directly


























Hence the expression of proposition 2 is obtained. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 implies that the results on urn models can be applied in order to establish theorem
1, observation 1 and observation 2. Thus if ¹ is replaced by ¸ and Pr[Vc(m) ¸ n] is replaced with
uc;m;n(¸m) then the proofs are applications of results on urn models.
Proof of theorem 1 Apply corollary 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of observation 1 Apply lemma 6. Q.E.D.
Proof of observation 2 Apply lemma 4. Q.E.D.





= 0 for a · b ¡ 1.
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